Five dichotomies in the psychophysics of ensemble perception by Solomon, J. A.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Solomon, J. A. ORCID: 0000-0001-9976-4788 (2020). Five dichotomies in the 
psychophysics of ensemble perception. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, doi: 
10.3758/s13414-020-02027-w 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/23918/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13414-020-02027-w
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
 1 
Five dichotomies in the psychophysics of ensemble perception 
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Centre for Applied Vision Research, City, University of London EC1V 0HB  
 
Abstract 
1. Whereas psychophysicists may formulate hypotheses about appearance, they can 
only measure performance. Bias and imprecision in psychophysical data need not 
necessarily reflect bias and imprecision in perception. 
2. Sensory systems may exaggerate the differences between each item and its 
neighbors in an ensemble. Alternatively, sensory systems may homogenize the 
ensemble; thereby removing any apparent differences between neighboring items. 
3. Ensemble perception may be involuntary when observers attempt to report the 
identities of individual items. Conversely, when asked to make a (voluntary) decision 
about the ensemble as a whole, observers may find it very difficult to compute 
statistics that are based on more than a very small number of individual items. 
4. Modeling decisions about prothetic continua like size and contrast can be tricky, 
because sensory signals may be distorted before and/or after voluntarily computing 
ensemble statistics. With metathetic continua, like spatial orientation, distortion is less 
problematic; physically vertical things necessarily appear close to vertical and 
physically horizontal things necessarily appear close to horizontal.  
5. Decision processes are corrupted by noise that, like distortion, may be added to 
sensory signals prior to and/or after voluntarily computing ensemble statistics. 
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The ginkgo leaves fell like fine rain from the boughs and dotted the lawn 
with yellow….I said I would like to distinguish the sensation of each 
single ginkgo leaf from the sensation of all the others, but I was 
wondering if it would be possible. 
 –Italo Calvino, If on a winter’s night a traveler, 1979 
 
There are two types of people: Those that see dichotomies everywhere, and I’m one 
of them. It is my hope that some of what follows may serve as a tutorial to students of 
ensemble perception. Readers of this listicle should be forewarned: most of the 
examples provided below were produced in my own laboratory. Whitney and 
Yamanashi-Leib (2018) offer a more balanced review.  
 
Appearance v Performance 
 The epigraph suggests that individual sensations may depend on whether they 
form part of an ensemble. The author of this passage is a character in Calvino’s book. 
His suggestion is almost certainly correct, but I want to underscore the fact that 
psychophysicists are fundamentally incapable of directly measuring sensation. 
Physiologists can directly measure neural output, but all a psychophysicist can do is 
measure visual performance. The ensemble may bias our perception of any individual 
ginkgo leaf, but bias and imprecision in psychophysical data need not necessarily 
reflect bias and imprecision in perception. 
 As an example, consider Brady and Alvarez’s (2011) investigation of the 
effect of ensemble membership on reproduction error. On each trial of their 
experiment, human observers re-sized a circle (with a computer mouse) to match one 
member of a previously seen ensemble of circles. Errors tended to be in the direction 
of the ensemble mean, but Brady and Alvarez did not unnecessarily infer any 
homogenization of perceived sizes within the ensemble. Although each individual 
circle’s size may have appeared closer to that of the ensemble mean, Brady and 
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Alvarez concluded that reproductions were consistent with a type of rational decision-
making, under uncertainty, given the limited capacity of visual working memory. 
 One of the most pernicious pitfalls in attempting to infer appearance from 
behavior is the subject-expectancy effect (e.g. Rosenthal & Rubin, 1978), in which 
experimenter expectations are transmitted to the participants in such a way as to alter 
the outcome of the experiment in a desired direction. There is, perhaps, no way to 
preclude non-perceptual biases from contaminating psychophysical estimates of 
appearance, but certain measures can be taken to minimize their likelihood and/or 
severity.  
 One strategy is to use a psychophysical paradigm in which observers’ 
response categories are de-coupled from experimenter expectations. For example, 
Morgan, Melmoth, & Solomon (2013) expected that vertically aligned spots would 
appear to have a clockwise tilt, when they were displayed within a square frame 
having a counter-clockwise tilt. Rather than asking observers to report the apparent 
tilt of the spots, they asked observers to inspect two sets of spots and report which set 
was closest to vertical. Sometimes both sets were clockwise, sometimes both sets 
were counter-clockwise, and sometimes one set was clockwise of vertical while the 
other set was counter-clockwise. Variants of this “comparison-of-comparisons” 
strategy have become increasingly popular (e.g. Maloney & Yang, 2003; Jogan & 
Stocker, 2004; Morgan, Grant, Melmoth, & Solomon, 2015; Morgan, Schreiber, & 
Solomon, 2016; Yarrow, Martin, Di Costa, Solomon, & Arnold, 2016; Ismail, 
Solomon, Hansard, & Mareschal, 2016). 
 Also popular are “double-blind” strategies, where steps are taken to remove 
the bias-inducing stimuli from the observer’s awareness. For example, it is possible to 
observe a tilt aftereffect after adapting to gratings with unresolvably high spatial 
 4 
frequency (He & MacLeod, 2001). The tilt aftereffect also survives removal of the 
adapting stimulus from awareness by crowding (defined below; He, Cavanagh, & 
Intrilligator, 1996) and critical-flash suppression (Bahrami, Carmel, Walsh, Rees, & 
Lavie, 2008).  
 One final strategy is to make performance depend upon appearance. 
Inferences regarding the latter can be made from objective measurements of the 
former. For example, Morgan and Solomon (2019) asked observers to select the odd-
man-out in a variety of visual search tasks, where performance is determined by the 
target’s relative salience, i.e. how different it appears from the distractors. Adaptation 
was used to manipulate target salience, and aftereffect strength was inferred from the 
degree to which performance was facilitated or impaired by adaptation.  
 
Repulsion v Assimilation 
Although it may be relatively trendy to consider how ensemble membership affects 
the appearance of its individual members, studies relating an item’s appearance to its 
general spatial and temporal context are nothing new. The motion aftereffect, for 
example, was described by Addams in 1834, who reported that the nearby rocks 
appeared to move upwards, after adapting to the downward motion of the Falls of 
Foyers. In 1855 (p. 8) Chevreul described the exaggeration of simultaneous 
luminance contrast between neighboring stripes with different graylevels. The general 
term for these sensory phenomena is “repulsion,” and it occurs in every feature 
domain I have examined. 
 Figure 1 (top panel) shows an example of the visual system exaggerating the 
simultaneous orientation contrast between neighboring Gabor patterns. The truly 
vertical central elements on either side of the fixation cross should appear to be tilted 
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in opposite directions when you stare directly between them. This can be described as 
an exaggeration of the difference between the orientation of each central element and 
the orientation of its flanking distractors. This exaggeration is usually pretty large for 
briefly presented stimuli (i.e., short flashes; Wenderoth & van der Zwan, 1989), but it 
also depends on the retinal eccentricity of the central Gabor patterns.  
 
 
Fig. 1.  Demonstrating repulsion and assimilation. The visual system exaggerates the 
orientation contrast between the (45°) tilted flankers and the vertical elements in the top 
panel. Small orientation differences, on the other hand, are effectively squelched. Thus, 
vertical flankers in the bottom panel can cause the small (4°) tilt to go unnoticed. 
 
 
 Exaggerations of simultaneous contrast are routinely ascribed to lateral 
inhibition somewhere within the visual system. The cartoon at the top of Figure 2 
represents 15 receptive fields somewhere in visual cortex, with lateral inhibition 
spreading around the cell whose receptive field is red. If lateral inhibition is 
responsible for the exaggeration of simultaneous contrast, then we have 
psychophysical data suggesting that lateral inhibition spreads very far indeed. 
Consider the red symbols in the lower half of Figure 2. They represent trials in which 
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flankers were tilted either 22° degrees clockwise or 22° degrees counter-clockwise of 
horizontal. When these flankers were present, they produced a negative or “repulsive” 
bias of roughly 10° when observers attempted to report the orientations of near-
horizontal targets. This was true even when the distance between flanker and target 
was almost half the latter’s eccentricity. 
 
  
Fig. 2.  Repulsion and assimilation: theory and experiment. Top panel contains a cartoon of 
15 “classical” receptive fields somewhere in visual cortex. Axes are one dimension of visual 
space (e.g. horizontal position x) and orientation preference θ. Horizontal stimuli positioned 
so as to maximally stimulate the central (red) cell indirectly and strongly inhibit nearby (light 
blue) cells and weakly inhibit the somewhat further (dark blue) cells, via lateral connections. 
Reciprocality in those connections means that the latter cells can also inhibit the central one. 
Thus, the amalgamation of these 15 receptive fields can be considered the “extra-classical” 
receptive field of the central cell. The lower panel shows average biases (symbols; ± 1 
standard error) and model fits (solid and dashed curves) to Experiment 3 from Mareschal, 
Morgan, & Solomon (2010), in which observers judged the orientation (with respect to a 
horizontal reference) of a flanked Gabor pattern at 4 and 10 degrees of retinal eccentricity. All 
flankers were identically rotated either –22°, –5°, +5°, or +22° with respect to the horizontal. 
 
 The blue symbols, on the other hand, represent trials in which the flankers 
were tilted just 5° off horizontal. When those flankers were close to the target, they 
seemed to produce a positive bias. This assimilation means that the visual system 
effectively makes it hard to notice subtle changes in orientation (and any other feature 
dimension you care to name), particularly when you don’t look directly at the 
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stimulus. Orientation assimilation is demonstrated in Figure 1B. You might need to 
look slightly to the left or right of the black cross, but you should be able to find a 
fixation for which you can still see all three Gabors without being able to see the 
differences in their orientations. 
 
Involuntary Averaging v Voluntary Averaging 
Whatever is responsible for small-angle assimilation, it too extends over a vast swathe 
of visual cortex. The only reason small-angle assimilation disappears when flankers 
and target are widely separated is because lateral inhibition is stronger. To get around 
the problem of lateral inhibition, some researchers have adopted tasks that should be 
immune to it. That is, they use visual tasks that do not require making fine 
discriminations between similar orientations or luminances or whatever. One task 
they particularly like is letter identification.  
 The idea behind Figure 3 is that the visual system is compelled to combine 
information from discrete stimuli, and consequently cannot disentangle the identity of 
one individual element from the overall statistics of information coming from that 
region of the visual field. In general, the name given to this phenomenon is 
“crowding,” and experiments with letter identification suggest a compulsory 
combination of visual information from individual letters separated by anything up to 
half their average eccentricity (Bouma, 1970). 
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Fig. 3.  Crowding. When fixating the dot on the top left, the N to the right is easily identified. 
When fixating the dot just below, the N seems to meld into a jumbled texture. Adapted from 
Cavanagh (2001). 
 
 Parkes, Angelucci, Lund, Solomon, & Morgan (2001) described crowding as 
“textural processing when we don’t want it to happen.” In other words, crowding is a 
form of involuntary ensemble representation. It is evident only when the visual task 
requires a decision about individual visual objects. I would like to distinguish such 
tasks from those that require a decision about the ensemble as a whole. In such cases, 
the computation of ensemble statistics may very well be voluntary. 
 When investigating ensemble representations, most of my work has been on 
voluntary averaging. For example, Solomon and Morgan (2018) recently assessed 
how well observers could estimate the average number of dots in a dot patch. The 
metric we used was efficiency. The paradigm was two (temporal)-alternative forced-
choice: observers were asked whether the dot patches in the first ensemble had greater 
or fewer dots on average than patches in a second ensemble. Obviously, if both 
ensembles had the same number of patches, then the question would be identical to 
asking which stimulus had more dots. However, in some blocks of trials, the first 
ensemble had eight patches while the second had just four patches. We also had 
blocks of four followed by eight. A Binomial distribution was sampled to determine 
the number of dots in each patch. To compute efficiency, you need to calculate the 
 9 
ideal performance with various fractions of the available information. For example, if 
human performance were similar to what an ideal observer could do with half the 
available information, then human efficiency would be 50%. 
 Figure 4A shows a flow-diagram of the Inefficient Observer model for 
voluntary averaging. There were N dot clusters, observer JAS selected M of these at 
random, measured their numerosities, and reported the mean of those M 
measurements. M is known as the effective sample size and the ratio of M:N is known 
as either the sampling efficiency or the calculation efficiency or simply “the 
efficiency.” For JAS M was about 3. 
 
Fig. 4.  The Inefficient Observer model applied to voluntary averaging of (A) numerosities, 
(B) sizes, and (C) orientations. Psychophysical transformations (from physical dimensions 
into visual signals) are shown in the insets of panels B and C. Note these transformations 
(expansive, compressive, or quasi-linear) may occur prior to or after statistical 
summarization. Panel (D) shows the Noisy Inefficient Observer model with both (pre-
summarization) early and (post-summarization) late sources of noise.  
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Prothetic v Metathetic Continua 
The inefficient observer model can be traced back to one (Dakin, 2001) of the two 
papers that massively popularized the study of ensemble statistics. Dakin studied 
voluntary averaging of orientation and Ariely (2001) studied voluntary averaging of 
size. Subsequently, I studied both, but orientation is easier, because it is a metathetic 
continuum. 
 The distinction was made by Stevens (1957). Simply put, prothetic continua 
are those like size and contrast, where one value is either greater than, equal to, or less 
than another. Metathetic continua like orientation and direction don’t work like that.1 
Prothetic continua like size can be tricky to work with, because apparent size may not 
scale linearly with physical size. Indeed, without sufficiently specific instructions (cf. 
Raidvee, Toom, Averin, & Allik, in press) it isn’t necessarily clear whether average 
size reflects average diameter, average area, or something in between. 
 Moreover, the transformation between physical size and apparent size could 
theoretically occur before and/or after voluntarily computing whatever statistic we 
wanted to study. The inset in Figure 4B shows three psychophysical (transducer) 
functions. The blue one is linear, the violet one is expansive, and the yellow one is 
compressive. 
 Solomon & Tyler (2018) studied voluntary averaging in the contrast domain. 
When asked to adjust the contrast of a static, black-and-white texture to match the 
average contrast of another black-and-white texture that was flickering between high 
and low contrast, all observers gave the static texture greater average contrast than the 
                                                 
1 Regarding this dichotomy, here is the exact quote: “Continua having to do with how much belong to 
what we have called Class I, or prothetic; continua having to do with what kind and where (position) 
belong to Class II, or metathetic” (italics as in Stevens, 1957, p. 154). 
 11 
flickering texture. This result is consistent with an accelerating or expansive 
transformation of physical contrast, prior to voluntary averaging. 
 With metathetic continua, like orientation, transformations like this don’t 
really matter, because we can be pretty confident that physically vertical things appear 
close to vertical and physically horizontal things appear close to horizontal. Thus the 
psychophysical function for orientation may stray a little from the blue line of 
veridicality in Figure 4C, but it can’t stray too far. 
 
Early v Late Noise 
Perhaps the most direct way to test how well an observer can voluntarily compute an 
average is to ask the observer to reproduce that average. Solomon & Tyler (2015) 
showed observers an ensemble comprised of eight low-frequency Gabor patterns in a 
ring around fixation (see Figure 5A). Their orientations were drawn from a Wrapped 
Normal distribution. The mean of that distribution was totally random, but its standard 
deviation was either zero or 16°. The ensemble was visible for 0.42 s. A high-
frequency, “probe” Gabor was presented at fixation after the ensemble had 
disappeared. Observers rotated the probe until its orientation matched their memory of 
the ensemble’s average orientation.  
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Fig. 5.  Voluntary averaging of orientation. (A) Stimulus from Solomon & Tyler (2015). 
Observers adjusted the central probe to match their memory of the surrounding ensemble’s 
average orientation. (B) Histogram of a representative observer’s adjustment errors when the 
SD of low-frequency Gabor orientations was zero. (C, D) Threshold v Noise (in this case, the 
SD of adjustment errors v the SD of the distribution of ensemble orientations) plots, fit with 
the Noisy, Inefficient Observer model assuming zero late noise (i.e. σL = 0; C) and zero early 
noise (i.e. σE = 0; D). Smooth curves are maximum-likelihood fits to thresholds (dots) from 
JAS. Dashed lines illustrate the ideal observer. 
 
 Although the Inefficient Observer model (Figure 4A) is useful in some cases; 
in general, it is not a good model of human performance, because humans cannot 
measure feature values like orientation with infinite precision. If they could, then 
response errors would have dropped to zero when all eight of the low-frequency 
Gabors were parallel. Errors do not drop to zero, as can be seen in Figure 5B. Thus 
the Inefficient Observer model needs modification. Perhaps the most straightforward 
way to modify the model is to assume that each measurement made by the observer 
gets perturbed by an independent, identically distributed sample of noise, as 
illustrated in Figure 5C. 
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 This Noisy, Inefficient Observer model for voluntary averaging (and other 
summary statistics) has two free parameters: the effective set-size M, and the standard 
deviation of noise σE:  
   .    (1) 
Within this simple formula, the standard deviation of response errors increases as a 
function of the standard deviation of orientations in the ensemble. A fit to one 
observer’s data is shown in Figure 5C’s threshold-v-noise plot. The axes are 
logarithmic, so data from the condition with parallel Gabors appears at the leftmost 
edge of the plot. When the model is best-fit to these two data points, its noise has a 
standard deviation of 10.4 degrees. The effective set size is 1.5.  
 Non-integer values such of effective set size can be interpreted in two ways. 
One possibility is that they reflect a mixture of effective set sizes. For example, on 
some trials I might have ignored or forgotten all but one randomly selected element, 
whereas on other trials I computed the average of two or more. In this case, M would 
reflect the root-mean-square of this number. Alternatively, non-integer values of M 
might reflect an unequal weighting of two or more of the texture elements.2  
 The smooth curve in Figure 5D illustrates a slightly different Noisy, 
Inefficient Observer: 
   error S.D.2 =s L
2 +
stimulus S.D.2
M
.    (1) 
In this case, it’s as though the entire ensemble gets tilted by a random amount, rather 
than each individual element. The standard deviation of that random amount σL is 
                                                 
2 The Inefficient Observer model can be considered an extreme form of unequal weighting, in which   
N – M elements get zero weight. Whereas any form of unequal weighting is sub-ideal and thus 
inefficient, equal weighting does not imply 100% efficiency. An observer whose responses on each 
trial are based on a single, randomly selected element will have an efficiency of 1/M, but – on average 
– weight will have been distributed equally over all elements in the sample. 
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called “late noise” in this formulation.3 The first thing to notice is that the two 
versions of the model make exactly the same predictions. The second thing to notice 
is that the best-fitting value of M does not depend on whether individual samples of 
equivalent noise are correlated. Thus, if all you care about is the effective set size, you 
can use either formula, it doesn’t matter. 
 I attempted to ascertain whether the noise that limited the precision of 
orientation statistics was early or late (Solomon, 2010). This would have been 
impossible if I had merely asked obserers to judge the average orientation of 
ensembles having a fixed size. Consequently, I varied the size of the ensemble, taking 
care not to change the precision with which the orientation of each individual element 
could be assessed, and I also varied the task: in some trials, observers were asked to 
assess the variance of orientations in the ensemble, rather than the mean. The results 
contained compelling evidence for both early and late noise. When members of an 
ensemble are all roughly identical, any effect of sample size N on the precision of 
voluntary averaging must be attributed to early noise. On the other hand, late noise is 
implicated when the effect of the sample’s size increases with the sample’s variance.    
 
In conclusion, I would like to underscore two features/caveats with regard to the 
efficiency metric. First, it is a purely descriptive measure of performance in relation to 
the available information. Given any sample size N, efficiency is the ratio of M to N, 
where M is the sample size that the ideal observer would need in order to estimate a 
                                                 
3 Note that segregating the cause of imprecision into an early and late stage is somewhat arbitrary. If, 
instead of late noise, we allow the random perturbation added to the orientation of any two 
elements to have correlation 𝜌, then we can reparameterize Equations 1 and 2 such that: 
  .   (3) 
Note that when 𝜌=0, Equation 3 reduces to Equation 1 with σ = σE; when 𝜌=1, Equation 3 reduces 
to Equation 2 with σ = σL. 
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statistic with the same precision as a human observer.  Since the ideal observer is, by 
definition, at least as good as any other observer, human decisions are necessarily 
based on M or more elements. Second, and most important, estimates of efficiency tell 
us nothing about ensemble perception per se. With strategic decision-making 
strategies, reasonably high efficiencies can be achieved from independent 
representations of individual stimuli. Authors discussing various strategies include: 
Myczek & Simons (2008), Solomon (2010), Dayan & Solomon (2010), Gorea, 
Belkoura, & Solomon (2014), and Li, Herce Castañon, Solomon, Vandormael, & 
Summerfield (2017). 
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